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INDIAN RIGHTS: NATIVE AMERICANS VERSUS
AMERICAN MUSEUMS-A BATTLE FOR ARTIFACTSI
Bowen Blair*
Introduction
The degradation of American Indian culture is a familiar feature
in United States history. By depriving Indians of artifacts which
possess special religious and ceremonial significance, American
museums are contributing to this cultural debasement. Several
Indian groups have initiated formal, yet nonlegal, requests for
the return of these relics. However, museums, often relying upon
solid legal and practical grounds, have typically ignored these
requests.
An analysis of two confrontations between Indians and
museums, concerning Zuni War Gods and Iroquois wampum
belts, clarifies the legal and moral issues involved. A further ex-
amination of the federal Antiquities Act' and its proposed
replacement, 2 the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion,3 and a recent Public Law,' reveals legal solutions available
to assist Native American attempts to protect undiscovered ar-
tifacts and to reclaim those artifacts presently held by museums.
Case Studies
In the late sixteenth century, 5 members of the Iroquois
Nation's Onondaga Tribe fashioned belts from purple and white
clam and conch shells.6 These wampum belts were an integral
part of the Iroquois culture. Symbols woven into the belts con-
stituted the Onondagas' only recorded history.7 Furthermore, ac-
t Portions of this note were published in an earlier version in the American Indian
Journal, Vol. V, No. 5, at pp. 13-21, and in Vol. V, No. 6, at pp. 2-6. These portions are
reprinted in this version with permission from the American Indian Journal.
* J.D. expected 1980, Lewis and Clark Law School, Northwestern School of Law.
Issue Editor of Environmental Law.
1. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1825, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Act of Aug. 11, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469.
5. Akwesasne Notes, May 1970, at 1, col. 4. For historical account of the Iroquois
wampum, see A. MOLLOY, WAMPUM (1977).
6. N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1971, at 44, col. 6.
7. ARTS ADVOCATE, Jan. 1975, at 1, col. 1.
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cording to Chief Irving Powless, the belts "are our religion and
our law combined." 8
In 1898, under questionable circumstances, 9 the New York
State Museum at Albany obtained twenty-six of the Onondagas'
wampum belts. Among these belts was perhaps the Iroquois'
most famous, the Hiawatha belt. 10 Although the Onondaga
refuse to attach a price to the wampum belt, experts estimate its
art value at $280,000.1"
The Onondaga later demanded the return of the belts. Each de-
mand was refused by the state museum. In 1971, public pressure
resulted in the passage of an act' 2 which provided for the return
of five wampum belts to the Onondaga. However, this return was
conditional. The first condition stipulated that facsimiles of the
belts had to be displayed at the state museum, to replace the
genuine articles.' 3 The second prerequisite required the Indians to
build an "appropriate," "fireproof" facility on their reservation
to house the wampum belts.' 4 The adequacy of the housing
would be determined by the museum's council on the arts,"
which also retained the power to institute a "special proceeding"
to compel the return of the wampum belts should the Onondaga
fail to comply with the Act's provisions.' 6 This second prere-
quisite was a practical impossibility.' 7
The twin War Gods, Masewi and Oyoyewi,' 8 like the Iroquois
wampum belts, play an essential role in Zuni culture and religion.
The War Gods symbolize courage, strength, and virtue.' 9 The
cult of the War Gods, or A'hayuta, is delegated to the bow
priests in the Zuni Tribe,2" who also constitute the executive arm
of the Zuni religious hierarchy. 2' The annual ceremony of the
1. N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1971, at 44, col. 6.
9. See discussion in text at note 58, infra.
10. N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1970, at 40, col. 2.
11. Id. The Iroquois analogize the pricing of the wampum belts with Anglo-
Americans setting a price on the Declaration of Independence. See ARTS ADVOCATE,
supra note 7, at 2, col. 3.
12. N.Y. INDIAN LAw § 27 (McKinney).
13. Id. at (2).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. This requirement has to date remained unfulfilled. See note 34, infra.
18. 47 U.S. BUREAU OF ETHNOLOGY ANN. REPORTS 64 (1932).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 525.
21. Id. at 562.
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bow priests is held at the winter solstice,22 and six days after the
announcement of this solstice, men from the Deer and Bear clans
start creating the images of the War Gods.2 3 These images,
known to the art world as actual War Gods, are wooden, pole-
like carvings, frequently adorned with eagle feathers. The War
Gods are used in Zuni kivas, sacred ceremonial chambers closed
to non-Zunis. 24 After the ceremonies, the War Gods are placed
on specific mountain peaks on Zuni land, where they continue to
serve a religious purpose."
The Zuni are currently negotiating with at least two museums,
the Smithsonian Institute and the Denver Art Museum, for the
return of War Gods stolen from the Zuni reservation at the turn
of the century. 26 Neither museum has been receptive to the Zuni
requests. The Smithsonian, following the lead of the New York
State Museum, has offered to return the images if the Zuni will
build an adequate museum.27
To fully appreciate the American Indians' desire for the return
of these and similar artifacts, an understanding of Native
American culture and religion is essential. However, that analysis
exceeds the scope of this note, and a generalization must suffice:
religion pervades every aspect of Indian life, particularly Indian
art. Chief Oren Lyons of the Onondaga succinctly articulated this
tenet; "Religion, as it has been and is still practiced today on the
reservation, permeates all aspects of tribal society. The language
makes no distinction between religion, government, or law.
Tribal customs and religious ordinances are synonymous. All
aspects of life are tied in to one totality. ' 28 Indian artifacts,
therefore, can rarely be separated from Indian religion. Wam-
pum, for instance, is art as well as religion; it also represents Iro-
quois culture, history, and current existence. Zuni religious
leaders concur with the appraisal, and describe their artifacts as
"the essence of our Zuni culture." ' 29 Moreover, the loss of these
artifacts to museums has created for the Zuni "an imbalance in
22. Id. at 526.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 527.
25. Id.
26. Telephone conversation with Bryant Rogers, Director, Zuni Legal Aid, Aug. 8,
1978. See also Letter from Indian Pueblo Legal Services, Inc., to Bowen Blair, Oct. 2,
1978.
27. Telephone conversation with Bryant Rogers, supra note 26.
28. ARTS ADVOCATE, supra note 7, at 2, col. 4.
29. See Appendix A, at item I, Statement of Religious Leaders.
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the spiritual world," ' 30 which can be rectified only by the return
of the artifacts.
The Museum Position
The issue of Indian reclamation of Indian artifacts from
museums is an extremely difficult one to resolve. Both sides
possess cogent moral and legal arguments. Museums generally
rely on four persuasive points: (1) their public responsibility to
preserve and exhibit the artifacts for the benefit of all Americans;
(2) their doubt as to specific Indian ownership; (3) their unwill-
ingness to establish a precedent of returning a part of their collec-
tions to original owners; and (4) their legal claims to the artifacts.
The reason most cited by museums for refusing to return the
Indian artifacts concerns their presumed public responsibility to
preserve and exhibit the artifacts for the benefit of all Americans,
not just the Indians.' The requisite corollary which follows this
justification-that Indian tribal museums have inadequate
facilities to similarly care for the objects-is largely true.32
According to Martin Link, the director of the Navajos' excellent
tribal museum for eighteen years, "there is not a single tribe, in-
cluding the Navajo, that is properly equipped to take care of any
large collections." 33 Museums also cite the poor locations of the
reservation tribal museums as a reason to refuse Indian requests.
These locations are considered to be inconvenient for the average
visitor.3"
There are several persuasive counter-arguments to museum
assertions that they provide the best places to preserve and exhibit
the Indian artifacts. Basically, Indians contend that because
museums do not share the Indians' religious concern and
30. Id. at 2.
31. See generally MUSEuM NEWS, Mar. 1973, at 22.
32. Reservation Indians are not wealthy. Disease, poverty, and substandard educa-
tion are realities in their life. The thought of raising enough money to build an "ade-
quate" Tribal Museum, especially during a period when private funding is unable to sup-
port the larger, more affluent white museums must seem ludicrous to the Indians. (See
generally MUSEUM NEws, Mar. 1973, at 22).
33. Letter from Martin Link to Bowen Blair, Aug. 26, 1978.
34. N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1971, at 44, col. 5. "In the early 1970's, museums arrived
at an ingenious solution to the problem of Indian requests for artifacts. Exemplified by
the New York State Museum and Smithsonian actions, museums offered to return part of
their collections to the Indians, if the Indians would build adequate housing for the ar-
tifacts. These acts bolstered the museums' images as concerned humanitarians, ensured
the preservation of the artifacts, and effectively negated the Indians' reclamation at-
tempts."
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knowledge for these objects, the artifacts are not well cared for.
The Zuni, for example, claim museums should not house the War
Gods because the gods' proper religious location is on mountain-
tops." Since the museums do possess the War Gods, however,
the Zuni argue that the gods should be properly preserved. To
them, proper preservation does not mean an annual lacquering of
the War Gods, as might be correct with other museum collec-
tions, but involves leaving the War Gods completely untouched.36
The gods are supposed to reside on mountain peaks, totally ex-
posed to the elements. This idea of purposeful deterioration is
alien to most museums, and Zuni efforts to prevent the unnatural
preservation of their War Gods have been ignored. 7
Indians are also worried that their sacred objects will be in-
discriminately deaccessioned to private collectors or foreign coun-
tries. In 1975 the Iroquois discovered that the director of the
Museum of the American Indian-Heye Foundation, Dr.
Dockstader, who was apparently low on museum funds, 38 had
"exchanged" two of the Iroquois' wampum belts for other
items. 39 A few months later, the museum's deaccessioning policy
was revealed in Lefkowitz v. Museum of the American Indian-
Heye Foundation.4" A trustee of this museum had become
suspicious when an art dealer offered to sell him several artifacts
which were listed in the museum's inventory.4 I The trustee soon
discovered that "deaccessioning was almost entirely handled by
the director, Dr. Dockstader, without comparative valuations,
committee approval or consultation with the trustees." 2 The anx-
iety felt by many Native Americans regarding this type of in-
discriminate deaccessioning was articulated by Iroquois Chief
Oren Lyons: "Just because the museums happen to be having a
financial crisis doesn't give them the right to sell and barter our
sacred objects. We're having a survival crisis. Those belts are our
history, our identity. They are beyond price." 3 Despite the
superior facilities of the larger museums, therefore, Indian ar-
tifacts may be better preserved by Indians.
35. 47 U.S. BUREAU OF ETHNOLOGY ANN. REPORTS 527 (1932).
36. Telephone conversation with Bryant Rogers, supra note 26.
37. Id.
38. ARTs ADVOCATE, supra note 7, at 3, col. 1.
39. Id.
40. C.A. No. 41416/75 (D.N.Y. 1975). See also L. DuBopp, THE DESKBOOK OF ART
LAW 887 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DUBOFF].
41. C.A. No. 41416/75 (D.N.Y. 1975).
42. DUBOF, supra note 40, at 887.
43. ARTS ADVOCATE, supra note 7, at 3, col. 1.
19791
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The second major argument used by museums to support their
retention of Indian artifacts concerns the museums' uncertainty
as to the identity of the legitimate Indian owners. The various
tribal laws regarding private ownership of art objects are com-
plex, especially to non-Indians. Hopi law is one of the clearest on
this subject. Generally, the personal goods of a Hopi man are in-
herited by his sisters, brothers, and clanspeople." Art objects and
artifacts, such as ancient masks, medicine bundles, and animal
figurines are clan property, usually controlled by the senior male
of the clan."- After the passage of several generations, artifacts
may change clans, may be claimed by several clans, or may be
claimed by several members within the same clan-all of which
raises difficult ownership questions.
Norman Ritchie, the chief ranger of the Navajo National
Monument, was involved in a complicated situation concerning
conflicting Indian ownership claims several years ago. The Monu-
ment had been displaying a Navajo medicine bundle which was
claimed by a relative of the original owner. Ritchie was prepared
to relinquish the bundle until several other relatives appeared and
also claimed it. According to Ritchie: "As it stands now, we have
the bundle, but the families involved have not determined to our
satisfaction who actually should get the bundle. We have the bun-
dle in safe storage, and will not exhibit it, and would be willing to
return it, but heirship in cases like this, when it has once been
sold, traded or given away becomes an interesting point in
Navajo law.""'
It is important to realize that the ownership question does not
appear in all, or even most, Indian reclamation attempts. For in-
stance, neither the New York State Museum nor the Smithsonian
could justifiably plead unknown or conflicting ownership of the
wampum belts and War Gods because these artifacts were in-
disputably created by the respective tribes, and the entire
tribes-not individual members-are seeking reclamation.
Furthermore, Zuni law is somewhat unusual in that very few
religious artifacts are privately or clan-owned. 7 Therefore, conflict-
ing claims of ownership among individual Zuni would be rare.
The third argument frequently presented by museums is that
even a single return of an artifact would create a dangerous
44. Beaglehole, Ownership and Inheritance in an American Indian Tribe, 20 IOWA L.
REv. 304, 307 (1934).
45. Id. at 308.
46. Letter from Norman Ritchie to Bowen Blair, July 13, 1978.
47. See Appendix A at item 2, Statement of Religious Leaders.
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precedent which could lead to the depletion of the museums' col-
lections.48 This reasoning, which is valid to an extent, seems to
underlie every Native American reclamation attempt.
Undoubtedly, successful tribal suits would encourage other
Indian tribes to initiate their own actions. Perhaps those suits
possessing similar factual and legal bases would also succeed,
which might reduce the holdings of certain museums, particularly
those specializing in Indian collections. In any case, museums
should not fear Indian successes spreading to other miniorities. A
victorious suit would probably be grounded upon the Indians'
religious ties to these objects,4 9 and few minorities possess similar
art/religion connections. Furthermore, Native Americans have a
more acute need for their artifacts than do other minorities
because unlike these groups (with the exception of Mormons),
Native Americans cannot return to the "old country" to regain
sacred artifacts and lost religious traditions. American Indians
have only the United States. Thus, despite the setting of prece-
dent, the detrimental effects on Native Americans from not being
able to worship and conduct their religion as in centuries past
would seem to outweigh the occasional loss of artifacts by
museums.
The fourth major argument proposed by museums is that they
possess valid legal title to the artifacts. Certainly American prop-
erty law, which confers ownership of .all artifacts or objects
found on private land in the landowners, 0 favors museums. The
landowner may sell, destroy, or exploit any such object,
regardless of who the original owner was. 5'
However, all museum property does not derive from private
ownership. Much is illegally expropriated from public land, or
land owned by Native Americans.52 Clemency Coggins, a noted
art historian, described a common museum attitude toward ar-
tifacts discovered on Indian land: "As far as many American
museums are concerned, a bird in the hand is worth everything.
Museum people are schooled in the acquisition, conservation,
and practical esthetics of objects in relation to museum collec-
tions. They believe that any object which is acquired by a
48. Akwasasne Notes, supra note 5, at 1, col. 4. This argument was proposed by
the New York State Museum, among others.
49. See discussion in text at note 99, infra.
50. Annot., 170 A.L.R. 708 (1947).
51. Id.
52. See generally 36 AM. ANTIQUITIES 374 (1971), for a discussion of the illegal anti-
quities trade.
19791
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museum is necessarily in a better place than it was before.... 1)53
Zuni religious leaders believe this attitude is directly responsible
for the theft of their artifacts: "The thefts and illegal selling of
these Zuni religious items and artifacts is based primarily on the
practice and willingness of museums, both private and public,
to pay high prices for these items.""4
Indian "gifts" to museums also should be scrutinized. For in-
stance, according to the New York act which concerned the wam-
pum belt return, the Iroquois in 1898 "duly elected" the Univer-
sity of the State of, New York "to the office of wampum
keeper."" Closer inspection invites skepticism regarding this
"election."
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Regents of the New
York State Museum, apprehensive that the Iroquois tribes were
breaking up and would take the valuable wampum belts out of
New York, elected Harriet Maxwell Converse promoter of a drive
to "rescue" as much wampum as possible.16 Despite the ob-
vious conflict of interests, Mrs. Converse persuaded the Onon-
daga chiefs to appoint her their attorney in their efforts to
reclaim wampum held by John Thatcher, the mayor of Albany. 7
She next convinced the chiefs their case would be improved if
they elected the Board of Regents "wampum-keeper with full
power to get possession and safely keep forever all wampums of
the Onondaga and Five Nations.""
In the ensuing court battle against Thatcher, commenced in
1898-only eight years after the battle of Wounded Knee, when
anti-Indian feelings inflamed the country-the Iroquois failed to
regain their wampum. 9 The court also ruled that the university
had never been selected wampum keeper.60 The 1971 New York
legislature's actions declaring the "election" of the university to
"wampum keeper," therefore, appear inexplicable.
Considering the time period in which many museums received
Indian artifacts, and the continuing existence of prejudice against
Indians in parts of the United States, no museum's assertion of
53. Coggins, Archeology and the Art Market, 175 SCIENCE 263, 264 (1972).
54. See Appendix A, at item 4, Statement of Religious Leaders.
55. N.Y. INDIAN LAW § 27(1) (McKinney).
56. ARTs ADVOCATE. supra note 7, at 2, col. 2.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Onondaga Nation v. Thatcher, 29 Misc. 428, 61 N.Y.S. 1027, 169 N.Y. Rep. 584
(1901).
60. Id.
[Vol.7
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valid legal title should be accepted without suspicion. Kenneth
Hopkins, the director of Olympia's State Capitol Museum, con-
curs with this postulate:
As for materials that were not "stolen," I doubt their ex-
istence. The legalisms that confound the picture of Indian
dispersal apply as well to Indian cultural relics. Here in our
Northwest, we live on land "legally" acquired from the
Indians. Yet as the history of the acquisition falls under
scrutiny, we in local history find ourselves in the awkward
position of trying to interpret events that we would prefer not
to have to interpret. 6'
It should not be inferred, however, that all, or even the
majority, of museums are unethical or refuse to entertain serious In-
dian requests for sacred artifacts. For instance, when Hopi elders
demanded the return of deeply religious kiva masks on exhibit in
Phoenix's Heard Museum, the director willingly complied.62
Another encouraging incident occurred in Santa Fe in 1977, when
the Wheelwright Museum returned eleven sacred medicine bundles
to four Navajo medicine men.63 Overall, the brightest future for
Native American reclamation attempts rests upon the beliefs of
men like Olympia's Director Hopkins, who declared, "Indian
material belongs with Indians. I draw no lines around this, set up no
perimeters, fall back on no qualifications. Indian material to In-
dians. Nothing less." 61 Because museums are generally not as
cooperative as these southwestern ones, and their directors not as
obliging as Hopkins, Native Americans. must rely upon other
methods to protect and procure their religious artifacts. United
States laws provide some hope.
Pertinent Laws
The best way for Indians to secure their artifacts is to prevent
their removal from Indian lands. The Antiquities Act of 190665 at-
tempts to accomplish this. The third section66 of this Act imposes a
61. MUSEuM NEWS, Mar. 1973, at 23.
62. ART NEWs, Dec. 1977, at 94.
63. Letter from Susan McGreevy, Director of the Wheelwright Museum, to Bowen
Blair, July 14, 1978.
64. MUSEUM NEWS, Mar. 1973, at 23.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976).
66. "Any person who shall appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy any historic or
prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity, situated on lands owned or con-
trolled by the Government of the United States, without the permission of the Secretary
1979]
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$500 fine and/or ninety days imprisonment on anyone ap-
propriating an "object of antiquity' 67 from federal land without
permission. Since many remaining Indian sites existed on land in
the public, domain and within the purview of this Act, 68 the Anti-
quities Act seemed an ideal mechanism to protect Indian artifacts.
Unfortunately, the Act contains two major limitations. First, the
Act does not protect artifacts from museums; in fact, it encourages
museum exploitation. Permits will be granted "for examination of
ruins, . . . excavation, . . . and the gathering of objects of
antiquity '6 9 upon these lands, "Provided, That the examinations,
excavations, and gatherings are undertaken for the benefit of
reputable museums.... with a view to increasing the knowledge of
such objects, and that the gatherings shall be made for permanent
preservation in public museums." 0
Any "reputable" museum can acquire a permit through the An-
tiquities Act to collect sacred artifacts from federal land. The
"reputable" restriction represents no consolation for Indians who
have witnessed museums such as the Smithsonian appropriate ar-
tifacts from their lands. 7' The Act nevertheless does vicariously af-
of the Department of the Government having jurisdiction over the lands on which said
antiquities are situated, shall, upon conviction, be fined in a sum of not more than $500
or be imprisoned for a period of not more than ninety days, or shall suffer both fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court." 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1976).
67. Id.
68. See Wilson & Zingg, What is America's Heritage? Historic Preservation and
American Indian Culture, 22 KAN. L. REv. 413, 422 (1974).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1976).
70. Id.
71. Few, if any, tribes in the Southwest have escaped serious damage from the
"pothunters" who roam tribal and federal lands seeking Indian relics. The size and
organization of these illegal groups vary as much as their motives; the groups range from
heavily armed, high-profit squads equipped with bulldozers and four-wheel drive vehicles,
to the single tourist bumbling for an authentic souvenir of his vacation. The destruction
wrought by the larger groups is particularly severe. Since a premium is placed upon speed
in order to avoid detection, broken pots and crushed artifacts are the inevitable conse-
quences of these well-organized raids. Accoiding to art historian Clemency Coggins, a
more subtle yet equally pernicious damage accompanies the pothunters' incursions:
"Once a site has been worked over by looters in order to remove a few salable objects,
the fragile fabric of its history is largely destroyed. Changes in soil color, the traces of an-
cient floors and fires, the imprint of vanished textiles and foodstuffs, the relation between
one object and another, and the position of a skeleton-all of these sources of fugitive in-
formation are ignored and obliterated by archeological looters." Coggins, Archeology
and the Art Market, 175 SCIENCE 263 (1972).
Illegal pothunting and the resultant destruction of sites and artifacts has increased
significantly the past few years [see 125 CONG. REc. E427 (daly ed. Feb. 8, 1979) (remarks
of Rep. Udall)]; see also ApizONA REPUBLIC, Mar. 6, 1978)]. A Tucson art dealer
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol7/iss1/6
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fect museums by prohibiting excavations conducted by
unscrupulous "pothunters,"72 who frequently sell their illegal boo-
ty to museums. 71 Moreover, regulations adopted after the enact-
ment of the Antiquities Act have attempted to restrict this liberal
permit system. 74 For instance, permits may be granted only after
obtaining the consent of Indian landowners, who may prescribe
special conditions for the digging.7" The concurrence of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs official having jurisdiction over the property also
is required.76 Furthermore, once the permit has been issued and the
excavation completed, the permittee must restore the land to the
satisfaction of the individual Indian and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs."
The second and most serious limitations apparent in the Anti-
quities Act involves its failure to define what constitutes an "ob-
ject of antiquity." Specifically, how old must an artifact be
before it is included in this definition? The sparse legislative
history supporting the Act 78 does not clarify this uncertainty. For
instance, the Act's sponsor in the House, Congressman Lacey,
declared the purpose of the Antiquities Act was to "cover the
cave dwellers and cliff dwellers ... [and] to preserve these old
objects of special interest and the Indian remains in the pueblos
in the Southwest." ' 79 Cases which interpret the Act are more il-
luminating with respect to this "object of antiquity" standard.
estimates that 80 percent of the Hopi pots presently being traded were illegally excavated
on public lands [Hochfield, Plundering Our Heritage, ART NEWs, Summer, 1975, at 31].
Some experts recognize pothunting as the major cause of site destruction in the Southwest
[id.]. There seems to be no single basis for this pothunting proliferation. Several factors,
including increased outdoor recreation by Americans, a new awareness and appreciation
for Indian culture with a concomitant rise in the price of Indian art, and a greater
availability of technically sophisticated machinery, such as metal detectors and four-wheel
drive vehicles, probably have contributed. For a good article which discusses the problems
created by pothunters, see Hochfield, supra.
72. Hochfield, supra note 71, at 30.
73. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.17 (1978), which details what applications for permits
must specify; i.e., time, place, persons involved, etc.
74. 25 C.F.R. § 132.2 (1977).
75. Id.
76. Id. at § 132.5.
77. Telephone conversation with Bryant Rogers, supra note 26. See also Letter from
Indian Pueblo Legal Services, Inc. to Bowen Blair, Oct. 2, 1978.
78. H.R. REP. No. 2224, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1906); S. REP. No. 3797, 59th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1906). For a more detailed discussion of the congressional intent behind
the Antiquities Act, see Cooper, Constitutional Law: Preserving Native American
Cultural and Archeological Artifacts, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 99, 100 (1976).
79. 40 CONG. REc. 7888 (1906).
1979]
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The first criminal case to deal with this standard, United States
v. Diaz,"° represented a major setback for Indians' efforts to pro-
tect their buried artifacts. A United States magistrate convicted
defendant Diaz of stealing Apache religious artifacts-" approx-
imately twenty-two face masks, headdresses, ocotillo sticks, bull-
roarers, fetishes and muddogs," 8' from a medicine man's cave on
the San Carlos Reservation, and fined him five hundred dollars.2
On appeal, Diaz argued that since the artifacts were less than five
years old, they did not constitute "object[s] of antiquity." 83 The
appellate court, however, upheld the lower court's decision,84
concluding: "The determination [of the meaning of 'object of
antiquity'] can be made only after taking into consideration the
object or objects in question, the significance, if any, of the ob-
ject and the importance the object plays in a cultural heritage.""
This definition, because it accounts for the artifacts' cultural
and religious value to the Indians, would have been ideal for
Native Americans living on federal land. Unfortunately, in Diaz's
second appeal,86 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed his
conviction. 7 The court decided that the Antiquities Act, because
it failed to define "ruin," "monument," or "object of
antiquity," was unconstitutionally vague. 8
The Ninth Circuit's decision was extended to an even more
frustrating conclusion in United States v. Jones. 9 Jones allegedly
violated the Antiquities Act, but the prosecutors, realizing that
no conviction in the Ninth Circuit under the unconstitutional Act
was possible, instead indicted him for violations of theft and
malicious mischief statutes. The court dismissed the charges,
holding it was Congress' intent that the Antiquities Act be the ex-
clusive means through which the government could prosecute a
defendant for activities encompassed by the Act, even though
other statutes covered the same activities.9 0
As will be discussed,9' Congress is presently attempting to cor-
80. 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
81. United States v. Diaz, 368 F. Supp. 856, 857 (D. Ariz. 1973).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 859.
85. Id. at 858.
86. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
87. Id. at 115.
88. Id.
89. 449 F. Supp. 42 (D. Ariz. 1978).
90. Id. at 46.
91. See discussion in text at notes 120-144, infra.
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rect this unfortunate hiatus. Several western states92 and Indian
nations,93 moreover, have anteceded congressional action by
enacting their own antiquities acts which generally provide clearer
definitions of "object of antiquity," promulgate stronger
penalties for violations, and pertain to nonfederal land.
Despite the Ninth Circuit decisions, the Antiquities Act is not
impotent. Other circuits are not bound by the Ninth. The Tenth
Circuit,94 for instance, has upheld the constitutionality of the An-
tiquities Act in cases involving Mimbres Indian artifacts." These
92. For instance, Colorado defines an "object of antiquity" as "any historical,
prehistorical, or archeological resource" [CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-80-409 (1973)],
whereas New Mexico's definition includes "any object of historical, archeological, ar-
chitectural or scientific value" [N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-27-11 (1953)]. South Dakota prom-
ulgates the strictest penalty for violations of its antiquities act-a $1,000 fine and/or six
months' imprisonment, in addition to forfeiture of all appropriated materials [S.D.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 1-20-35].
93. See Appendix B for the Navajo Antiquities Act. The reason for the Act's lenient
penalties involves limitations to tribal jurisdiction, not a lack of desire by the Navajo to
punish pothunters. The Hopi probably possess the most effective "antiquities act"; after
a series of particularly devastating artifact losses, they simply closed their reservations to
non-Hopis. See Hochfield, supra note 71, at 32.
94. The Tenth Circuit, which includes New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Oklahoma,
Kansas, and Wyoming, contains numerous and exceptionally valuable Indian sites and ar-
tifacts. This circuit is matched only by the Ninth, which includes California, Nevada,
Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and Montana.
95. In October of 1975, three brothers were arrested by Forest Service officers while
illegally excavating a Mimbres Indian ruin. [United States v. Quarrell, C.A. No. 76-4
(D.N.M. 1976) (criminal complaint)]. The artifacts in the Quarrell brothers' possession
included "two metates, two grooved stone axes, other miscellaneous stone tools, three
nearly complete Mimbres bowls, and a quantity of assorted sherds." [Collins, A Proposal
to Modernize the American Antiquities Act, 202 SCIENCE 1055, 1057 (1978)] Trial
testimony established the age of the pottery at between eight and nine hundred years. The
court decided these artifacts qualified as "object[s] of antiquity," upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Antiquities Act, and found the defendants guilty. For stealing these ar-
tifacts, worth approximently $2,700, and for causing irreparable damage to a rare Mim-
bres archeological site, two of the Quarrells were sentenced to one year of supervised pro-
bation, and required to perform forty hours of community service.
Two years after the Quarrell case, another Mimbres Indian ruin, this one in the Gila
National Forest in Gila, New Mexico, was looted by pothunters [United States v. Smyer &
May, C.A. No. 77-284 (D.N.M. 1977) (criminal complaint)]. The damage at this site was
extensive; Forest Service officers found 800 sherds, an abundance of chipped stone ar-
tifacts, and severely damaged skeletal remains. Defendants May and Smyer admitted
responsibility and confessed selling two of the bowls discovered at the ruin for $4,000. A
search of the defendants' residences uncovered over 30 Mimbres black-on-white bowls, in
addition to numerous other artifacts.
Smyer and May were charged with eleven counts of violating the Antiquities Act. The
court decided the eight- to nine-hundred-year-old artifacts were protected by the Anti-
quities Act, and that the Act was constitutional. Judge Bratton elaborated: "While it may
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1979
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courts ecided that the Act's "object of antiquity" standard was
sufficiently precise for cases dealing with 800- to 900-year-old ar-
tifacts. 6 Even if the majority of courts were to uphold the con-
stitutionality of the Antiquities Act, however, the Act applies ex-
clusively to uncollected artifacts. For laws which would aid
Indians in reclaiming artifacts held by museums, one must look
elsewhere.
The first amendment to the United States Constitution declares
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."" This amend-
ment is binding on the states through the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause,98 and is also applicable to the
states through their own constitutions.
Case law has extended this religious protection. In Sherbert v.
Verner," a Seventh Day Adventist was denied unemployment
compensation because she refused, for religious reasons, to take
jobs which would require her to work on Saturday.' ° In a land-
mark decision, the Supreme Court upheld her right to compensa-
tion and declared that the first amendment's free exercise clause
protects religious practice, as well as religious belief.' 0' In
Sherbert, the Court also instituted a balancing test which weighed
an individual's right to the free exercise of the practices of his
chosen religion, against any compelling state interest in regulation
of these practices. 0 2
In People v. Woody,' °3 the Supreme Court of California ap-
plied the Sherbert holding to a fact situation involving Navajo
Indians. The Woody court dealt with the use of peyote in Navajo
religious ceremonies. 1'0 The Sherbert test balanced the Navajos'
not be possible to state in the abstract a precise number of years that must pass before
something becomes an 'object of antiquity,' such exactitude is not required .... The An-
tiquities Act must necessarily use words 'marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth,
rather than meticulous specificity,' in order to accomplish its purposes." [Citations omit-
ted.] Id. The Judge then sentenced Smyer and May to imprisonment for ninety days on
each of the eleven counts, the, terms to run concurrently. Id. The case is presently being
appealed.
96. See discussion at note 95, supra.
97. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
98. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
99. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
100. Id. at 399.
101. Id. at 404.
102. Id. at 406-409.
103. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
104. Id.
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right to practice their religion, of which peyote is an integral part,
with the state's interest in prohibiting the use of hallucinogenic
drugs. The decision of the court to protect the Navajos' rights
hinged upon the importance of peyote consumption to the Nava-
jos' religion as practiced in the Native American Church:
"Although peyote serves as a sacramental symbol similar to
bread and wine in certain Christian churches, it is more than a
sacrament. Peyote constitutes in itself an object of worship;
prayers are directed to it much as prayers are devoted to the Holy
Ghost." 0 5
Just as the Navajos' peyote does, wampum and War Gods con-
stitute "object[s] of worship" to the Iroquois and Zuni. As ex-
plained earlier,106 these artifacts represent the essence of Iroquois
and Zuni life. Moreover, because of Native Americans' unique
fusion of art and religion, a great percentage of Indian artifacts
currently held by museums would be included as "object[s] of
worship." By retaining these sacred artifacts, museums are, in ef-
fect, interfering with the Indians' right to practice their religion,
as guaranteed by Sherbert.
To determine whether this first amendment protection should
apply to the Indian artifact situation, the interests of both the
Indians and the museums must be balanced within the context of
the Sherbert test. For the Indians, the artifacts are needed to
practice their religion, to rectify "an imbalance in the spiritual
world."' 01 Iroquois and Zuni religion without wampum and War
Gods would be similar to Navajo religion without peyote.
The contravening "compelling state interest"108 exists in the
museums' reasons for retaining the artifacts: (1) their public
responsibility to preserve and exhibit the artifacts for the benefit
of all Americans; (2) their doubt as to specific Indian ownership; (3)
their unwillingness to establish a precedent of returning a part of
their collections to original owners; and (4) their legal claims to the
artifacts. As explained earlier, all of these justifications have been
at least partially eroded by a closer examination of their founda-
tions.' 9 Furthermore, assuming these assertions were valid, it is
doubtful whether they would outweigh the Indians' right to prac-
tice their religion.
105. Id. at 721, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 at 817.
106. See discussion in text at notes 29-36, supra.
107. See Appendix A at item 2, Statement of Religious Leaders.
108. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
109. See discussion in text at notes 32-64 supra.
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In Woody, prohibition of peyote did not constitute a "com-"
pelling state interest," despite the drug's possible "deleterious
effects upon the Indian community, and even more basically, in
the infringement such practice [peyote use] would place upon the
enforcement of the narcotic laws . ""s If museums were forced
to relinquish a few holdings, the effect on the community would be
considerably less grave then the potential effects of the Woody
decision. No possibility of flagrant disregard of drug laws, or a
drug overdose epidemic, would exist. Actual physical harm is not
involved. Therefore, it seems the state's interests in protecting its
citizens are significantly less compelling in the Indian artifacts
situation than in a situation such as that in the Woody case.
Furthermore, should the religious practices and the "compel-
ling state interest" ever assume equal weight in the balancing test,
the court must rule in favor of religious practices."' Once a
plaintiff demonstrates that a statute imposes a burden on his
religious practice, this showing brings him within the purview of
the first amendment, 1 2 "and entitles his religious freedom to a
'preferred position' on the scales of the balance. This 'preferred
position' rebuts the normal presumption in favor of the constitu-
tionality of statutes. Moreover, it erects a contrary presumption
in its place-a presumption favoring religious freedom."" 3
The problem with applying a first amendment solution to an
Indian artifacts situation is that neither Congress nor the states
have enacted many laws directly abridging Indian religious prac-
tices. One notable exception is the New York law which refuses to
relinquish the wampum belts until the Iroquois build an "ade-
quate" shelter to house the belts." 4 Since this law seriously in-
terferes with the Iroquois' first amendment freedom to practice
their religion, and because the counter-balancing "compelling
state interest" is slight, an argument can be made that the New
York law should be declared unconstitutional.
One museum which occupies a central position in the Indian
artifacts controversy, and which may be more vulnerable to a
first amendment attack, is the Smithsonian Institute. In addition
110. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 722, 394 P.2d 813, 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74
(1964).
Ill. Breslin, Recent Developments: Statute Prohibiting Use of Peyote Unconstitu-
tional as Applied to Religious Users, 17 STAN. L. REv. 494 (1965).
112. Id. at 498.
113. Id.
114. N.Y. INDIAN LAw § 27 (McKinney).
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to possessing numerous essential Indian artifacts,"15 the Smith-
sonian controls the actions of many other museums in this field.
For instance, all museum applications for excavation permits on
federal land must be referred to the Smithsonian for recommen-
dation." '6 Of greater consequence, no Indian artifacts collected
under the auspices of the Antiquities Act can be removed from a
public museum without the written permission of the Smith-
sonian's Secretary.' Because Congress created the Smithsonian,"'
and it is controlled by members of Congress,' Congress should
be held accountable for the Smithsonian's actions. Smithsonian
acquisition policies which infringe upon Indians' religious prac-
tices are in this sense directed by Congress and thus are subject to
first amendment attack. Considering the Institute's prestigious
and authoritative position among American museums, even a
partial relinquishment of its Indian artifact collection would
establish a particularly persuasive precedent for other museums
to follow.
Even where Congress and the states have enacted no laws
directly abridging Indian religious practices, the first amendment
serves as a solid foundation for a viable policy argument.
Freedom of religion is perhaps the most important tenet support-
ing United States society. Museums should not be permitted to
erode this doctrine by acquiring and retaining artifacts of fun-
damental religious significance to Native American people.
Recent Laws
Two recent actions by Congress should aid Native American
attempts to protect or regain their artifacts from museums. Con-
gress has recently passed the Archeological Resources Protection
Act of 1979,120 which modifies the Antiquities Act. This
modification significantly strengthens the Act and should correct
its constitutional deficiencies. The second congressional action
produced Public Law 95-341 on American Indian Religious
115. Telephone conversation with Bryant Rogers, supra note 26. See also Letter from
Indian Pueblo Legal Services, Inc. to Bowen Blair, supra note 26.
116. 43 C.F.R. § 3.8 (1977).
117. Id. at § 3.17.
118. 20 U.S.C. § 41 (1974).
119. Id. at § 42.
120. Pub. L. 96-95 (approved Oct. 31, 1979). To date this law is unpublished.
However, the final text may be found at H.R. 1825, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REc. S14719-S14721 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1979). For the original version, see H.R. 1825,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); the Senate version is S. 490, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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Freedom,' 2 ' which represents a crucial governmental policy shift
toward the rights of Native Americans regarding the practice of
their religions.
The Archeological Resources Protection Act, sponsored in the
House by Congressman Udall' 2 and in the Senate by Senators
Domenici and Goldwater,'23 was formulated by the archeological
community and Departments of Interior and Agriculture.' 24 This
bill should benefit Native Americans who seek to protect their ar-
tifacts in three important respects. First, the bill corrects the An-
tiquities Act's constitutional defect by clarifying the "object of
antiquity" standard. The Archeological Resources Protection Act
substitutes the term "archeological resource""'2 for "object of
antiquity," and, unlike the Antiquities Act, proceeds to define
"archeological resources":
The term "archaeological resource" means any material re-
mains of past human life or activities which are of ar-
chaeological interest, as determined under uniform regulations
promulgated pursuant to this Act. Such regulations containing
such determination shall include, but not be limited to: pot-
tery, basketry, bottles, weapons, weapon projectiles, tools,
structures or portions of structures, pit houses, rock paintings,
rock carvings, intaglios, graves, human skeletal materials, or
any portion or piece of any of the foregoing items. Nonfossilized
and fossilized paleontological specimens, or any portion or
piece thereof, shall not be considered archaeological resources,
under the regulations under this paragraph, unless found in an
archaeological context. No item shall be treated as an ar-
chaeological resource under regulations under this paragraph
unless such item is at least 100 years of age.' 2 6
The particularity of this definition should satisfy the vagueness
problem enunciated in the Diaz case. 2 " Instead of being con-
fronted with the nebulous "object of antiquity" standard, judges
would be able to resort to the Archeological Resources Protection
121. Act of Aug. 11, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469.
122. 125 CONG. REc. H433 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Udall).
123. 125 CONG. REc. S1798 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Domenici).
124. Letter from Charles McKinney (Consulting Archeologist for the Department of
the Interior's Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation) to Bowen Blair, Feb. 28,
1979.
125. Pub. L. 96-95 § 3(1) (1979), H.R. 1825, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 96 CONW. REC.
S.14719 § 3(1) (1979).
125. Id.
127. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
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Act's practically conclusive list and easily determine whether the
particular artifact was included in the provision.
Although solving the vagueness problem, the bill's "ar-
cheological resource" standard contains a major drawback for
Native Americans. Only objects "which are at least one hundred
years of age' 128 are protected. Thus, a sacred Zuni War God,
carved only forty years ago, could be essential to Zuni religion
but would not be safeguarded by the act. In order to fully protect
Native American culture, this arbitrary age criterion should be
eliminated and a standard which emphasizes the cultural value of
the artifact to its creators substituted.' 29 Even with this limita-
tion, however, the Archeological Resources Protection Act's "ar-
cheological resource" standard represents a notable improvement
over the Antiquities Act.
The second major revision of the Antiquities Act contained in the
Archeological Resources Protection Act concerns penalties for
violators of the Act. The Antiquities Act's 73-year-old penalty pro-
vision-a $500 fine and/or 90 days' imprisonment, constitutes little
more than a business expense for the modern pothunter 30 receiving
up to thousands of dollars for a single pot.'3 '
The Act advances two types of sanctions. For the occasional
violator of this legislation, such as the "unwary tourist, 13 2 the
Federal Land Manager who oversees the applicable land may levy
a civil penalty. 33 This penalty shall take into account: "(A) the
archaeological or commercial value of the archaeological resource
involved, and (B) the cost of restoration and repair of the
resource and the archaeological site involved. '3 Should the
same person again violate this legislation, similar computations
would be made, but the fine could be doubled.
35
128. Id. The 100-year limitation can be traced to an earlier proposal, 43 Fed. Reg.
14,975 (1978). This proposal, submitted by the Heritage Conservation and Recreation
Service also concerned the revision of the Antiquities Act's "object of antiquity" stan-
dard, and suggested that protection should be given to artifacts which were older than a
hundred years (id. at 14,976). The original bill before the House set the limit at fifty
years. H.R. 1825, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H433 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1979).
129. A good example of such a standard was enunciated by the trial court in United
States v. Diaz, 368 F. Supp. 856, 858 (D. Ariz. 1973). See quotation in text at note 85.
130. See generally 125 CONG. Rac. H433 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1979) (remarks of Rep.
Udall).
131. Hochfield, supra note 71, at 31.
132. 125 CONG. REc. H433 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Udall).
133. Pub. L. 96-95 § 7(a)(1).
134. Id. at § 7(a)(2).
135. Id.
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The Archeological Resources Protection Act also contains
criminal penalties which are more appropriate for modern
pothunters than the 1906 Antiquities Act. Any person who know-
ingly violates the new law will be subject to a $10,000 fine and/or
one year imprisonment.' 3 6 However, "if the commercial or ar-
chaeological value of the archaeological resources involved and
the cost of restoration and repair of such resources exceeds the
sum of $5,000," the offender will be subject to a fine of not more
than $20,000 and/or two years' imprisonment.' 3 7 Repeat of-
fenders are susceptible to a fine not to exceed $100,000 and/or
imprisonment not to exceed five years.' 3 8 Certainly these new
provisions provide a greater deterrent to pothunters than the An-
tiquities Act's $500 fine and/or 90 days' imprisonment
condition.' 3 9 As mentioned earlier,'4 once pothunters are de-
terred, many less scrupulous museums will lose their sources for
Indian artifacts. Thus, while not directly pertaining to museums,
the Act's stricter penalties should vicariously affect museum ac-
quisitions.
The third significant modification of the Antiquities Act pro-
posed by this bill entails an expansion of prohibited conduct. The
Antiquities Act forbids the appropriation, excavation, injury to
or destruction of any "object of antiquity,"'"' whereas the Act
would, in addition, outlaw the selling, purchasing, exchanging,
transporting, receiving, or offering to sell, purchase, or exchange
any such objects.' 42 This new addition is especially important
because it would directly encompass those museums obtaining ar-
tifacts from pothunters. Moreover, all museums would be forced
to scrutinize the origins of their Indian pieces acquired after the
effective date of this Act, and relinquish those artifacts of ques-
tionable origin in order to avoid the possibility of harsh punish-
merit under the Archeological Resources Protection Act.
The second recent congressional action which will have a
dramatic effect on Indian efforts to reclaim artifacts, Public Law
95-341 on American Indian Religious Freedom,' 43 was passed
August 11, 1978. This law clarifies the Indians' first amendment
136. Id. at § 6(d).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1976).
140. See discussion in text at notes 65-71.
14.1. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1976).
14.2. Pub. L. 96-95 § 5(b) (1979).
14.3. Act ofAug. 11, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469.
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right to freedom of religion. Most importantly, the law does not
seek to correct any express federal policy which infringes upon
Indians' religious practices. Instead, it attempts to rectify in-
justices which occurred from a lack of federal policy.' 44 As dis-
cussed supra, the first amendment protects Indians from laws which
directly infringe upon their religious practices; this law protects
these activities even when the infringement does not result from a
specific law. Therefore, Public Law 93-341 is particularly
beneficial with respect to Indian reclamation attempts, where the
retention of the artifacts by museums is often not supported by
laws susceptible to a first amendment attack.
The new law declares: "That henceforth it shall be the policy
of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians
their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise
the traditional religions of the American Indian, .. .including
but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred ob-
jects . . .1'4 To ensure compliance with this policy, "federal ex-
ecutive agencies are directed to evaluate their policies and pro-
cedures in consultation with Native religious leaders in order to
determine appropriate changes which may be necessary to protect
and preserve American Indian religious cultural rights and prac-
tices. 16 Furthermore, the law requires an annual presidential
report to Congress detailing the determinations, administrative
changes, and future recommendations made in conjunction with
this new policy. 147
In Public Law 95-341 the phrase, "use and possession of
sacred artifacts" is most pertinent to the Indian-museum con-
frontation. The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs which recommended passage of this law, Senator
Abourezk, described the Indians' relationship to the type of ob-
jects this law was meant to address: "To the Indians, these
natural objects have religious significance because they are sacred,
they have power..., they are necessary to the exercise of rites of
religion, they are necessary to the cultural integrity of the tribe
and, therefore, religious survival."' 48 The Committee also ac-
cepted testimony from Lee Lyons, a member of the Onondaga
Nation, regarding the New York State Museum's retention of the
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at § 2, 92 Stat. 470.
147. Id.
148. Hearings on S.J.R. 102 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 235, (1978) (Report to accompany S.J.R. 102).
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Iroquois wampum belts.' 49 This testimony further established the
relationship between Indian artifacts and religion: "[The wam-
pum] represents [the Iroquois'] way of life. It represents their
religion. It represents their culture, and their language, their
way. ,, 50
Because this law is so new, its effect on museums is unclear.
Certainly, it does not mandate wholesale surrender of the ar-
tifacts to the Indians. This law should demonstrate its greatest
strength in the area of federal funding of museums. Federal agen-
cies are required to "evaluate their policies and procedures"'' in
order to implement changes necessary to protect American Indian
religious practices.'52 Many museums that hold religious ar-
tifacts, thereby interfering with the Indians' "use and possession
of sacred artifacts," are at least partially financed by the federal
government. The Smithsonian Institute, for instance, is complete-
ly federally subsidized.' 3 Numerous museums also have obtained
federal tax-exempt status. 15" Federal agencies, in accordance with
this law, should withhold funds and remove tax exemptions from
museums that possess sacred artifacts to which Indians have
valid claims. Once the artifacts are returned, the exemptions and
special status could be restored. When confronted with the choice
of losing substantial federal subsidies and benefits, or yielding a
small part of their collection, museums would presumably select
the latter.
Public Law 95-341 does not represent the pinnacle of legislative
concern regarding Indian reclamation attempts. California, for
instance, which Senator Abourezk called "light years ahead of
the Federal Government,"'' 5 has an exceptionally progressive
statute. This statute states:
No public agency, and no private party using or occupying
public property, or operating on public property, under a
public license, permit, grant, lease, or contract made on or
after July 1, 1977, shall in any manner whatsoever interfere
with the free expression or exercise of Native American religion
149. Id. at 115.
150. Id.
151. Act of Aug. 11, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-341, § 2, 92 Stat. 470.
152. Id.
153. 20 U.S.C. §§ 54, 55 (1974).
154. DUBOFF, supra note 40, at 874.
155. Hearings on S.J.R. 102 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1978).
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as provided in the United States Constitution and the Califor-
nia Constitution. 56
Public museums, or private museums with public connections,
which retain sacred Indian artifacts, are affected by this
statute.5 7 The museums' retention of these artifacts certainly
would be encompassed by the statute's "in any manner what-
soever interfere with the free expression or exercise of Native
American religion" clause,' and thus would be outlawed.
An amendment to this statute,' 59 proposed by California's Of-
fice of Planning and Research, would immensely aid Indian ef-
forts to control their artifacts. This amendment would assign
California Indian artifacts discovered on public property to local
Indian cultural groups or to a public trust administered by the
Native American Heritage Commission. 6 ' The Commission con-
sists of nine members appointed by the governor, the majority of
whom must be "elders, traditional people, or spiritual leaders of
Californian Native American tribes.' 6'
The importance of this amendment derives from its specific
determination as to the ownership of the discovered Indian ar-
tifact, an issue which currently puzzles American museums. 62
The amendment declares:
In making such determination [regarding Indian ownership of
the artifacts] the Commission shall consider and base its deci-
sion on the following factors: (i) the relationship of a proposed
recipient to the creator of the artifact; and (ii) the ability of a
proposed recipient to preserve the artifact from destruction or
deterioration. In determining to which descendants a cultural
artifact should be returned, the Commission shall give first
preference to any descendants who reside in the locality where
156. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5097.9 (West 1971). This statute is not as broad as it
seems. Its major limitation is that "The public property of all cities, counties, and city
and county located within the limits of the city, county, and city and county, except for
all parklands in excess of 100 acres, shall be exempt from the provisions of this chapter."
Id.
157. Id. Private museums with public connections include museums located on public
property or those which have public leases. However, the limitations set out in note 156
must also be considered.
158. Id.
159. Cal. Proposal OPR-78-04. See also Hearings on S.J.R. 102 Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 218 (1978).
160. Id.
161. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 5097.92 (vest 1972).
162. See discussion in text at notes 44-47.
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the artifact was discovered; second preference to any descend-
ants who are residents of that state; and, third preference to
other California Indians.'63
Should no descendants of the artifact's creator be located, or
should the descendants not want the artifact, it would be placed
under the control of the Commission. 64 .The Commission would
preserve the artifact, occasionally lend it out, and return it to the
descendants should they be located and desire the artifact.'
Thus, the amendment not only requires ownership of Indian ar-
tifacts to be placed with the Indians instead of museums, but it
clearly sets out the procedure through which this transfer will be
effectuated.
Conclusion
Many American Indians rely today upon sacred artifacts
created by their ancestors. By withholding these artifacts,
American museums are disrupting essential Indian religious prac-
tices.
Indians have achieved little success in their efforts to reclaim
these artifacts.'6 This is often because museums possess solid
legal and practical grounds for retaining their collections. Recent
legislative actions, however, have strengthened the Indians' posi-
tion.
The Archeological Resources Protection Act represents a
tremendous improvement over the Antiquities Act, and should
discourage illicit museum appropriations of Indian artifacts.
Public Law 95-341, the most progressive enactment regarding
Indian religious freedom, was not passed until August of 1978.
These laws, combined with older rights, such as the first amend-
ment's freedom of religion clause, equip Indians with persuasive
legal arguments to employ against museums. The future,
163. Cal. Proposal OPR-78-04. See also Hearings on S.J.R. 102 Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 218 (1978).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. According to James Nason, a member of UCLA's Department of Anthropology,
these efforts will continue, as well as increase: "[Indian reclamation attempts are] not a
fad so much as a representative facet of the growing interest of American Indians in their
own cultural heritage and in their identity as contemporary residents of this country.
Museum specimens are not only the physical respresentations of this heritage and identity,
but also the symbols of the loss of American Indian autonomy and culture by military,
legal and demographic processes." MUSEUM NEws, March, 1973, at 20.
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therefore, should reveal legal challenges brought by Indians
against museums, greater Indian success, and a concomitant
heightening of museum awareness and understanding for the re-
ligious needs of Native American people.
APPENDIX A
ZUNI TRIBAL COUNCIL
ZUNI, NEW MEXICO
RESOLUTION NO. M70-78-991
WHEREAS, the Zuni Tribal Council consisting of the Governor,
Lieutenant Governor and six Tenientes, is declared to be the
legislative authority of the Pueblo of Zuni by Article V, Section 1
of the Constitution of the Zuni Tribe; and,
WHEREAS, the Zuni Tribal Council is authorized by Article
VI, Section 1, (d) of the Constitution and to act in all matters
that concern the welfare of the tribe; and,
WHEREAS, The Zuni Tribal Council has for several years
been aware of the increasing problems posed for the Zuni people
by the loss, theft or unauthorized removal from Zuni lands of
items of sacred religious significance to the Zuni people; and,
WHEREAS, on May 30, 1978, the Tribal Council initiated a
formal process by which this problem and the related problem of
securing proper care for and/or return of such items as may now
be in possession of museums or other third parties might be ad-
dressed and resolved; and,
WHEREAS, it is recognized and stated by the Tribal Council
in its May 30th memorandum that "because this effort ultimately
involves protection and return of objects which are intimately
bound up with the traditional religious practices and doctrines of
the Zuni Tribe, the appropriate tribal religious leaders should
have final control over the process of policy making and decision
making in this matter"; and,
WHEREAS, the Zuni Religious leaders have thoroughly con-
sidered this problem in their religious councils of which detailed
transcripts in the Zuni language have been prepared and from
which the official Tribal Translator has abstracted a brief formal
statement in the English language of the position of these
religious leaders on this matter, said statement being attached
hereto and dated September 20, 1978; and
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Zuni
Tribal Council does hereby formally adopt the attached statement
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of the Zuni religious leaders as the official position of the Zuni
Tribe on this matter, and does hereby reiterate the Council's full
support of the Zuni Religious leaders in their efforts to protect
and to secure proper care for or return of items of religious
significance to the Zuni people; and,
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Zuni Tribal Council
hereby request that all museums and other third parties as ap-
propriate work with the Zuni Tribe to resolve the problems iden-
tified in this resolution by implementation of the recommenda-
tions attached hereto and dated September 21, 1978.
[Signed by]
Zuni Tribal Council:
Dorson Zunie, Lt. Governor
Virgil Wyaco, Teniente
Fred Bowannie, Sr., Teniente
Chester Mahooty, Teniente
Lowell Panteah, Teniente
Chauncey Simplicio, Teniente
Certification
I hereby certify that the foregoing resolution was duly considered
by the Zuni Tribal Council at a duly called meeting at Zuni, New
Mexico at which a quorum was present and that the same was ap-
proved by a vote of 7 in favor and 0 opposed on Sept. 23, 1978,
Edison Laselute, Governor
Pueblo of Zuni
Approved by
Edison Laselute, Governor Sept. 23, 1978
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Statement Of
Religious Leaders of the Pueblo of Zuni
Concerning Sacred Zuni Religious Items/Artifacts
Prepared By
Wilfred Eriacho, Official Tribal Translator,
From a Written Transcript in the Zuni Language of
A Meeting of the Religious Leaders of
The Pueblo of Zuni
Held on May 9, 1978
September 20, 1978
We the Religious and Civil leaders of the Zuni people hereby
develop this statement based on six basic premises/com-
ponents/cultural ways, of the Zuni culture.
1. The Zuni religion originated with the creation of the
world, and exists to protect all beings on the earth, and to pro-
vide fertility and abundance of goodness for the Zuni people and
their neighbors throughout the world. Our priests and religious
leaders take on responsibility for carrying out the intricate rituals
and ceremonies that are the framework of our religion only after
years of preparation and training. Dedication and seriousness of
action is required by all involved in the Zuni religion to ensure its
beneficial effects.
2. All religious items/artifacts/objects, no matter how in-
significant it/they may seem to non-Zunis, are of very high/great
religious value. They are in fact, the essence of our Zuni culture.
3. Very few items/artifacts of religious significance are
created by knowledge and skill of any one individual. The ma-
jority of these items/artifacts were created by groups of religious
orders, each having skill or expertise in a specific fact/aspect of
the Zuni religious culture.
4. Very few items/artifacts of religious significance are
privately/individually owned. The majority of these items/arti-
facts have been created for the benefit of all the Zuni people, and
are communally owned.
5. No one individual or a group(s) of individual(s) has/have
the right to remove communally owned religious items/artifacts
from the Zuni land for any purpose/reason whatsoever. This is il-
legal according to traditional Zuni Law, and to do so is tanta-
mount to theft. Privately owned religious items/artifacts can be
sold by their owners although we call this selling your life and do
not condone it.
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6. The historical disruption of the Zuni religion by first the
Spanish colonial government and later by the United States
government; and by the theft and removal of sacred items/arti-
facts by museums and private collectors, has created an im-
balance in the spiritual world. In order to restore harmony to all
living things, this balance needs to be restored.
Meetings of and by the religious and civil leaders of the Zuni
Tribe have identified the following problems as being very
detrimental to the well being of the Zuni people. The foremost
problem, the one that distresses the Zuni people the most is the
removal of religious items/artifacts from the Zuni land. It hurts
us that throughout the whole world, religious items/artifacts
belonging to the Zuni people are displayed in museums, both
public and private, and in private collections. These display
places are far removed from Zuni land, for whose benefit these
items/artifacts were created.
When a Zuni religious item is made/created, many religious
orders participate in its creation. Every step of its creation is ac-
complished with prayer and instruction for the purpose. Its
general purpose is to provide both a beneficial psychological and
physical environment for the Zuni people. An environment that
will cause the Zuni people to prosper in products, wisdom, skill,
and all good things. Even though these items are created/con-
structed out of inanimate articles such as wood, leather, rock,
and other such things, it is with and through religious prayers and
instructions during the construction that it gains/achieves
spiritual life to perform the benefits for the Zuni people. Thus
each and every Zuni religious item is greeted/addressed as being
one's father or mother, or child. The purpose of these religious
items/artifacts has been defeated/destroyed by their removal
from the Zuni land. Any beneficial qualities that they were to
bestow upon their Zuni people, and, by extension, the whole
world through their innate wisdom have been destroyed. Adverse
effects have developed.
The theft/stealing of religious items/artifacts from their sacred
places in and around Zuni land has diminished their effec-
tiveness. Because of our cultural beliefs, many of these items/ar-
tifacts are not to be locked up but are to be placed at various
locations in and around Zuni lands if they are to fulfill their pur-
pose. These locations were determined in Ancient times. The
thefts and illegal selling of these Zuni religious items and artifacts
is based primarily on the practice and willingness of museums,
both private and public, and private collectors to pay high prices
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for these items. The placing of monetary value on religious
items/artifacts leads to theft of more religious items/artifacts for
sale on world art markets. The display or storage of religious
items/artifacts as art objects or ethnological curiosities helps to
foster and sustain the market demand for religious items/ar-
tifacts.
Because of the many adverse effects and conditions that have
been experienced by the Zuni people, we have made a decision to
respectfully request the return of all our communal religious
items/artifacts currently on display or in storage in the world
museums and to try to stop the theft and sale of sacred Zuni
religious items/artifacts. This decision is based on our desires to
perpetuate our Zuni culture in its full/total context/totality with
the blessing from our spiritual fathers, mothers, and children
which are rightfully ours. In order to accomplish this very essen-
tial goal, we need your assistance and directions/instructions. We
ask for your assistance in achieving this goal.
APPENDIX B
Resolution of the Navajo Tribal Council
ENACTING AN ANTIQUITIES PRESERVATION LA W
Passed January 27, 1972
(59 in favor: 0 opposed)
WHEREAS:
1. The Navajo Nation contains many ruins and excavation of
Archaeological sites and objects of antiquity or general scientific
interest, and
2. These sites and objects are irreplaceable and invaluable in
the study of the history and preservation of the cultural
background of the Navajo Nation, and
3. Large quantities of rare objects, pottery, petrified wood,
fossils and artifacts have been sold to tourists and traders and
these pieces of Navajo history and culture have been irretrievably
lost to the detriment of the Navajo Nation as a whole.
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT:
1. After the date of this resolution, any Indian who shall in-
tentionally appropriate, excavate, injure or destroy any object of
historic, archaeological, paleontological, or scientific value, or
any Indian who shall hold or offer for sale any historic or pre-
historic object of archaeological, paleontological, or scientific
value, without permission from the Navajo Tribal Council as
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provided in Navajo Tribal Council Resolution CF-22-58 (16 NTC
233), shall be guilty of an offense and if convicted, punished by
labor for not more than one month or a fine of not more than
$500, or both.
2. After the date of this resolution the unauthorized buying,
holding for sale or encouraging of illicit trade of objects of
historical, archaeological, paleontological, or scientific value by
any person or employee shall be good cause for withdrawing a
business privilege pursuant to Navajo Tribal Council Resolution
CMY-33-70 (5 NTC 51) or terminating a lease pursuant to Navajo
Tribal Council Resolution CJ-38-54 (5 NTC 77 (b))
3. After the date of this resolution any non-Indian who shall
intentionally appropriate, injure, destroy, buy, hold or offer for
sale or encourage illicit trade of objects of historical, ar-
chaeological, paleontological, or scientific value may be excluded
from Tribal land subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe in
accordance with procedures set forth in Navajo Tribal Council
Resolution CN-60-56 and Resolution CN-64-60 and found in 17
NTC 971-976.
4. The Navajo Tribe's Department of Parks and Recreation
and Navajo Tribal Museum shall be the lawful repository for and
guardians of Navajo Tribal property of historical, archaeological,
paleontological or scientific value.
Distributed courtesy MUSEUM AND RESEARCH DEPART-
MENT, The Navajo Tribe Window Rock, Arizona 86515
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